

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED] Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP80T01002A000200010001-3
Room 7E31 Hqs.

[REDACTED]
Herewith the [REDACTED] manuscript with
our comments. They were prepared by
[REDACTED] Chief of our Soviet Staff.

[REDACTED]
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Director, Political Research

Att

Date 21 October 1976

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Comments on Chapter III and IV of paper on the place
of the trade union movement in Soviet policy

We found this exposition, overall, well-informed and informative.

1. A question might be raised, however, with respect to one major point: do the Soviets at present attribute as much significance to international labor as an instrument of policy as is here suggested?

--Note, for example, the discussion in Chapter III where the evidence of Soviet efforts vis-a-vis the TU movement date back to the immediate post-war and Cold War period. Can the Soviets still manipulate the TU movement, when in most cases it is either a) non-communist, as in FRG, or b) controlled by largely autonomous Western CP's, such as the Italian CP.

Note also that on pp. 22-23 it is pointed out that the Soviet leaders have paid remarkably little public attention to TU affairs. Can we really assume, as is done on p. 23, that it is "almost certain" that they have devoted a great deal of thought to the use of the TU movement to "promote world revolution." Might it not be, as suggested later in the same paragraph, that Soviet involvement with the TU movement has simply become institutionalized?

If the Soviets really regard the TU movement as a major instrument of policy, they should devote a major share of their attention to it. One is hard put to demonstrate that this is the case, despite the invocation of labor solidarity by Soviet propagandists and functionaries.

In the same connection, do the Soviets really regard the working class of the capitalist countries as the "most promising revolutionary force?" (Chapter III, p. 7) There is considerable evidence that they have no very great

expectations vis-a-vis American labor, in particular. Soviet official spokesmen, from Brezhnev on down to Zagladin, have been emphatic in cautioning that the fall of capitalism will be a long time in coming. In practice, the Soviets seem to see more promise in the "national liberation" movements of the Third World, as in Angola, South Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.

2. A few lesser points:

Chapter IV, p. 3, A.M. Rumyantsev was dropped from the CC at the 25th Congress. His only remaining position is as a member of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences.

Arbatov is now a candidate member of the CC.

p. 5, We think it doubtful that Timofeyev has any policy responsibilities.

p. 33, It is a moot point whether the Soviets are "subtly pushing" Western TUs to undertake strike action, especially in countries where the local CP has established a degree of autonomy, or whether they find themselves confronted with situations in which they have to take a stand: naturally, against "capitalism."

p. 36, The CGIL has also withdrawn from active membership in the WFTU. Of course, it remains to be seen how meaningful this withdrawal is, but in view of the PCI's strained relations with Moscow it may not be entirely without meaning.

p. 41, Agree with the analysis in the first paragraph, which however, somewhat contradicts the earlier suggestion that the Soviets give priority to strikes or other actions which would directly weaken the West.

p. 42, Re the suspicions of pessimists: There is one key difference. This time around Soviet control of the Western European CP's is no longer unquestioned.

3. Finally, the analysis might be strengthened if the possible implications for Soviet TU policy of Moscow's strained relations with some of the major Western Parties were to be explicitly discussed in the European section. For example, is there any evidence that inter-Party conflicts have affected Moscow's support of TU unification in Italy, France, or Spain? If not, at what point might Soviet attitudes change? What implications would this have for the priorities Moscow has assigned to cultivating relations with TU movements in other parts of the world?